Abstract. We present a very practical string-commitment scheme which is provably secure based solely on collision-free hashing. Our scheme enables a computationally bounded party to commit strings to an unbounded one, and is optimal (within a small constant factor) in terms of interaction, communication, and computation. Our result also proves that constant round statistical zero-knowledge arguments and constant-round computational zero-knowledge proofs for NP exist based on the existence of collision-free hash functions.
Introduction
String commitment is a fundamental primitive for cryptographic protocols. A commitment scheme is an electronic way to temporarily hide a value that cannot be changed. Such a scheme emulates by means of a protocol the following twostage process. In Stage 1 (the Commit stage), a party called the Sender locks a message in a box, and sends the locked box to another party called the receiver. In Stage 2 (the De-commit stage), the Sender provides the Receiver with the key to the box, thus enabling him to learn the original message.
Commitment-schemes are very useful building blocks in the design of larger cryptographic protocols. They are typically used as a mean of ipping fair coins between two players, and also play a crucial part in some zero-knowledge proofs and in various types of signature schemes. Commitment schemes can also be used in scenarios like bidding for a contract, where committing to a bid rather than sending it in the clear can eliminate the risk of it being \leaked" to the competitors.
It is easily seen that if both parties have unlimited computational power, they cannot emulate the above process by just exchanging messages back and forth. Thus, at least one of the two parties must be computationally bounded, so that cryptographic technology can be applied. Indeed, many cryptographic implementations of commitment schemes have been suggested in the literature. A particularly important case of string commitment is when the Sender is computationally bounded, but the Receiver may have unlimited computational resources. This is so for at least three good reasons:
1. Bounded-to-unbounded commitment schemes allow one to use suitable short security parameters even if the Receiver has a lot of computing power. 2. Bounded-to-unbounded commitment schemes protect the Sender even if the underlying cryptographic assumption happens to be wrong (say, if the computational di culty of factoring is assumed, and the Receiver has a revolutionary algorithm for factoring). 2 3. There are theoretical applications in which one must use bounded-to-unbounded commitment schemes to yield the desired result; for instance, to obtain constant-round computational zero-knowledge proofs for NP (as shown in 11]), or to obtain statistical zero-knowledge arguments for NP (as shown by 13, 16] ).
Previous Work
Many commitment schemes in the unbounded-receiver model are known based on number-theoretic constructions. The rst such scheme was suggested by Blum 3] in the context of ipping coins over the phone. Blum described a commitment scheme for one bit, which is based on the hardness of factoring. Blum's scheme calls for one or two modular multiplications and a k-bit commitment string for every bit which is being committed to (where k is the size of the composite modulus). A similar construction with the same e ciency parameters was later described by Brassard and Cr epeau 4].
A more e cient construction, which is also based on the hardness of factoring, was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest 12] . Their collision-free permutation-pairs enables one to commit to long messages using about the same amount of local computation as in Blum's scheme, but to send only a k-bit commitment string, regardless of the length of the message being committed to. Since then, this construction was used in many other works (e.g. 2, 8, 9, 10, 14] ). One common problem of all these constructions is that they all rely on composite numbers of a special form (i.e., product of two primes which are both 3 mod 4). Thus they require a special initialization procedure in which these special-form numbers are established. Recently, Halevi 14 ] described a method which uses the GMR construction but avoids the need for this initialization step.
Several other constructions in the literature are based on the di culty of extracting discrete-logarithms. In particular, Pedersen 18] and Chaum, vanHeijst and P tzmann 8], described a scheme in which the Sender can commit to a string of length k (where k is the size of the prime modulus) by performing two modular exponentiations, and sending a k-bit commitment string.
There were also a few implementations of commitment-schemes using more generic complexity assumptions. Naor 15] presented a commitment scheme in the bounded receiver (and unbounded sender) model, which can be implemented using any pseudorandom-generator. As opposed to the previous schemes, however, Naor's scheme is interactive, and it requires 2 rounds of communication to commit to a string. The Sender in this scheme generates an O(n)-bit pseudorandom string and sends an O(n)-bits commitment string in order to commit to an n-bit message. In the unbounded receiver model -Naor, Ostrovki, Venkatesan and Yung 16] described a construction which is based on any one-way permutation. Their scheme is particularly ine cient, however, in that it calls for 2k rounds of communication and one application of the one-way permutation for each bit which is being committed to.
In addition to the above work, Several researchers showed that a commitment scheme for a single bit can be implemented using \quantum computing devices". The rst such scheme was the ( awed) scheme by Bennet and Brassard 1] . Better schemes were later suggested by Brassard and Cr epeau 5] and Brassard, Cr epeau, Jozsa and Langlois 6].
Our result
We present a commitment scheme which is provably secure under a standard assumption in the model in which the Sender is computationally bounded and the Receiver is all-powerful. Moreover, this scheme is more e cient than many other schemes discussed in the literature (even ones where both parties are computationally bounded).
The assumption under which we prove the scheme secure is the existence of collision-free hash functions. These are functions that map strings of arbitrary length to xed-length ones, so that it is computationally infeasible to nd two di erent pre-images of a common output string. Collision-free hash functions (often referred to as message-digest functions) are widely believed to exist, and are used extensively in cryptography, including in digital signatures schemes, authentication schemes, etc.
Efficiency. Let us now elaborate on the e ciency of our scheme. As for any other protocol, there are three important resources to consider: interaction, communication, and computation.
Interaction. Protocols are typically interactive because their parties communicate by exchanging messages back and forth. Interaction is, however, very expensive; because the number of rounds of communication heavily weigh on the overall running time of a protocol. Notably, our scheme is non-interactive. That is, in each stages the Sender sends a single message to the Receiver, who needs not to reply at all.
Communication. Another important resource in a protocol is the number of bits sent by its parties. In a commitment scheme, this is measured against the length of the message being committed to (denoted by n), and the security parameter (denoted by k).
It is easy to see that, in any commitment scheme, (1) the number of bits exchanged during the Commit Stage must be at least k, and (2) that the number of bits exchanged during the entire protocol must, on the average, be at least n + k. Our scheme requires that the Sender transmits O(k) bits in the Commit Stage and n+O(k) bits in the De-commit Stage (where the constant hidden in the O( ) notation is at most 9). Thus the overall communication complexity of our scheme is optimal within a constant factor.
Computation. A third crucial resource is the amount of (local) computation for the parties. Our scheme calls for (1) a single collision-free hashing of the message; (2) one collision-free hashing of a random O(k)-bit string (typically k = 128); and (3) one evaluation of a universal hash function on an O(k)-bit string (typically by multiplying this string by a binary matrix). 4 The e ciency of our scheme is comparable to that of schemes which achieve much weaker notion of security in weaker models. Indeed, it seems that even in the bounded-to-bounded model, the most e cient (reasonable) strategy for committing to a string consists of having the Sender transmit to the Receiver the value F( ), where F is a \good hash function". However, such a strategy is not secure enough. It is clear, for example, that upon receiving F( ), even a bounded Receiver may dismiss possible candidate strings 0 from consideration by checking that F( 0 ) 6 = F( ). It is therefore perhaps surprising that our scheme succeeds in being almost as e cient as the above \minimal" one, while o ering strong security in a more adversarial model.
We wish, however, to point out that our commitment scheme o ers slightly di erent security assurances than those o ered by prior schemes in the unboundedreceiver model. In those works, the Receiver had absolutely zero advantage in guessing what the Sender's message may be from its commitment. In our case, instead, the Receiver may obtain some advantage, but this advantage is provably exponentially small in the security parameter. Overall a small price, and one worth paying in order to have an e cient commitment scheme with a reasonable assumption. In Figure 1 we sketch the parameters of some of the schems in the literature, as compared to the scheme which we suggest in this paper.
Complexity-theoretic implications. Since our scheme works in the unboundedreceiver model, it also has complexity-theoretic implications. Namely, using our protocol in the constructions of 13, 16] yields constant round statistical zeroknowledge arguments for NP, and using it in the construction of 11] yields constant-round computational zero-knowledge proofs for NP.
Thus our result implies that both of these exist if collision-free hashing exists. Note that constant-round protocols of both kinds were previously only known to exist based on number-theoretic assumptions (since the bit-commitment in Receiver may get about the message from its commitment. 4 See Section 2 For a de nition and implementation of universal-hashing. We note that evaluating a universal hash function is typically cheaper than evaluating a collisionfree hash function.
Commiting to an n-bit message with security-parameter k the scheme works in model complexity assumption # rounds for commitment GMR-based 14] unbounded-receiver factoring Blum-integers 1-round Pedersen 18 ] unbounded-receiver discrete-log 1-round Naor 15] bounded-receiver pseudorandom-generator 2-rounds NOVY 16] unbounded-receiver one-way permutation 2k-rounds This paper unbounded-receiver collision-free hashing 1-round the scheme length of commit-string local computations 16 ] uses many rounds). Hence this work proves that these protocols too can be shown to exist based on generic complexity assumption.
A False Solution
Before presenting our scheme, it is useful to point out why simpler constructions based on collision-free hashing do NOT work. For the purpose of the discussion below we still rely on an intuitive understanding of what a commitment scheme is and when it does or does not work. The reader is referred to Section 2 for a more formal description. Let MD (for Message-Digest) be a collision-free hash function. One example of a false solution is provided by the \minimal" strategy discussed above (i.e., having the Sender commit to a message M simply by sending C = MD(M) to the Receiver, and de-commit by simply sending M.)
In an e ort to x the aw in this simple scheme, one may try to have the Sender rst pad the message M with a su ciently-long random string R, and then sends C = MD(M R) (where M R is the concatenation of M and R). Unfortunately, this construction may not work either (even when the Receiver is bounded). Indeed, it may be that MD, though collision-free, leaks some of the bits of M. In addition, in our more di cult model, the unbounded Receiver may get a good probabilistic advantage in guessing which of two messages M and M 0 is more likely to be the committed one. For instance, he can compute the size of the pre-image of C when the message is M, compare it to the size of the pre-image of C when the message is M 0 , and guess accordingly.
Of course, the latter attack can be prevented if MD has additional properties besides being collision-free (e.g., if MD is \regular"). However, we do NOT want to assume these additional properties in our construction, since the more assumptions we make, the less likely it is that these assumptions are true. Yet we wish to have an e cient commitment scheme whose security against an unbounded Receiver is PROVABLE.
Our Construction in a Nutshell
Our solution is similar in spirit to the second construction above, but \adds random bits" to the message in a more sophisticated way, thus enabling a proof of correctness against an unbounded Receiver without ANY additional assumptions.
For clarity of presentation we present the construction in two steps. At rst we present a simple scheme in which the commitment string is of length O(n+k), and then we show how to modify it so as to get an O(k)-bit commitment. Getting an O(k) commitment string. To reduce the size of the commitment string we observe that instead of applying the above scheme to the message M itself, we can rst apply the collision-free hash function to the message, thus obtaining a k-bit string s = MD(M), and then have the sender commit to s. In terms of the commitment-scheme above, this means that we have n = k and therefore the commitment is of length O(k + k) = O(k) bits. See Figure 3 for an illustration of the modi ed scheme.
Preliminaries 2.1 Universal Hashing
Universal hashing was introduced by Carter and Wegman 7] and it plays a very important role in many areas of computer-science. Let S and T be two sets, and let H be a family of functions from S to T. We say that H is a universal family of hash functions if for any two di erent elements s 1 6 = s 2 in S and for any two elements t 1 ; t 2 in T we have Pr h2H h(s 1 ) = t 1 and h(s 2 ) = t 2 ] = 1 jTj 2 For an easy example, when S = f0; 1g l and T = f0; 1g n we can have H = fh A;b : A 2 f0; 1g n l ; b 2 f0; 1g n g where we de ne h A;b (r) def = Ar + b (all the operations take place in a linear space over GF (2) ). To specify a function from this familywe need n(l+1) bits. A more e cient construction is to restrict A to be a Toeplitz matrix. That is, A should be xed on the diagonals, A i;j = A 1+1;j+1 .
This way we can describe any function in H using only 2n + l ? 1 bits. 
Statistical Di erence

Negligible Functions
We say that a non-negative function f(n) is negligible if as n gets larger, f(n) goes to zero faster than any xed polynomial in 1=n. That is, for any constant c > 0 there is an integer n c so that for all n > n c , f(n) < 1=n c .
Feasible Algorithms
We say that a (possibly randomized) algorithm A is feasible, if the running-time of A on inputs of length n is bounded by some polynomial in n.
Collision-Free Hashing
In this extended abstract we only provide an informal description of what a collision-free hash function is. Intuitively, a collision-free hash function is a function MD : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g k (for some integer k) so that it is infeasible to nd two di erent strings x 6 = y so that MD(x) = MD(y). That is, any feasible algorithm can only succeed in nding two such strings with negligible probability (where the probability is measured against k). For practical purposes, the SHA algorithm 19] is often considered to be such a function (for k = 160).
From the formal point of view, however, we must have a family of functions from f0; 1g to f0; 1g k , and the infeasibility requirement is formulated with respect to a function which is chosen at random from that family. Moreover, to get a meaningful de nition we must have in nitely many such families, each is indexed by a di erent k.
Commitment Schemes
In this paper we do not try to give the most general de nition possible for a commitment scheme. Instead, we restrict ourself to only talk about non-interactive schemes, which are the ones that we discuss. The Syntactic Structure of a Commitment Scheme. A commitment scheme is a protocol of two phases (the Commit and De-commit phases) between two parties (the Sender and the Receiver). Both parties share a common input, which is the security parameter of the system encoded in unary (we denote this by 1 k ). Besides 1 k , the Sender also has another input, m, which is the message string to which she wants to commit herself. When used inside some other protocol, the parties may also have other inputs which represent their history at the point where the commitment scheme is being invoked. The parties execute the Commit phase rst and the De-commit phase at some later time. Typically, when used in another protocol, there will be some other parts of that protocol between the Commit and the De-commit phases.
During the Commit phase the Sender sends to the Receiver a commit-string c and during the De-commit phase the Sender sends to the Receiver a de-commit string d. From c and d the Receiver computes the message m and then checks that m is consistent with c and d.
In a non-interactive commitment scheme we can view the Sender as a probabilistic algorithm Send which on input (1 k ; m) outputs a pair (c; d), and the Receiver as another algorithm Receive which on input (1 k ; c; d) outputs either a string m or the special symbol ? (meaning that the strings c; d are not the commit/de-commit strings for any message). The Semantics of a Commitment Scheme. The semantics of a commitment scheme should ensure that after the Commit phase the Receiver does not know anything about the message yet, but the Sender can not change it anymore, and that after the De-commit phase the Receiver is able to learn the message.
The de nition of what it means for the Receiver \not to know anything about m", and for the Sender \not to be able to alter m" depends on the computational power of the parties. In the context of this paper, the Sender is bounded to probabilistic polynomial-time and the Receiver has unbounded computational power. Thus, we require the following properties where the probability is taken over the random coin-tosses of Send' (and of Receive if it happens to be probabilistic). Remark 1. In the above de nition we chose to control both the statistical advantage that the Receiver gets from the Commit phase and the probability that the Sender can cheat in the De-commit phase by a single security parameter k. It is possible to have two di erent parameters controlling these two aspects. The generalization of the scheme we suggest below for that case is trivial. Remark 2. In the rst scheme we present, the Secrecy property only holds for messages of the same length. That is, the Receiver does learn the length of the message from the commitment string. However, in the nal construction this does not matter, since we only use the rst scheme to commit to messages of some xed length.
The First Scheme
In this section we present a commitment scheme in which the length of the commitment string is O(n + k), where n is the length of the message being committed to and k is the security parameter. Later, in Section 4 we show how this can be improved to get an O(k) commitment string.
For the rest of this section, x the message length n and the security parameter k and set L = 4k + 2n + 4. Let MD : f0; 1g L ! f0; 1g k be a collision-free hash function. That is, we assume that the Sender can not nd x 6 = y 2 f0; 1g L so that MD(x) = MD(y). Also, let H be a universal family of hash functions from f0; 1g L to f0; 1g n . The Commitment Scheme To commit to a message m 2 f0; 1g n , the Sender rst picks a random r 2 f0; 1g L and computes y = MD(r) and then picks a random function This scheme is indeed non-interactive and requires very little local computation. If we use the construction of universal hashing which we present in Section 2 then the size of the commitment-string is jhj + jyj = (L + 2k) + k = 7k + 2n = O(k + n) as promised. The only thing left to do is to prove that this is indeed a commitment scheme.
Analysis of the Scheme
The analysis if the scheme is fairly straightforward (though a little technical): The non-ambiguity part is obvious, as it is clear that being able to open the commitment in two di erent ways implies that the Sender can nd a collision in MD.
The less obvious part is to prove that the Receiver gets almost no statistical advantage about m from the commit string. To show this, we need to show that for any two messages m 1 ; m 2 , the distributions C k (m 1 ); C k (m 2 ) are statistically close (up to 2 ?k ).
Theorem1. For all k 2 N and m 1 ; m 2 2 f0; 1g n ; kC k (m 1 ) ? C k (m 2 )k < 2 ?k .
Proof. Before starting the proof, let us rst set some notations: In the scheme above, we denote by \C k (m) = hh; yi" the event that on input (1 k ; m), the Sender sends hh; yi as the commitment string. For any y 2 f0; The following proof is somewhat technical, but still rather straightforward. For the sake of readability we divide it into four steps: In Step 1 we give an explicit expression for the probability of the event C k (m) = hh; yi it terms of T(y; h; m). In Step 2 we use it to develop an explicit expression for kC k (m 1 ) ? C k (m 2 )k. In Step 3 we give an upper-bound on a key term of the last expression, and in Step 4 we plug this upper bound back in the expression to get the nal bound on kC k (m 1 ) ? C k (m 2 )k.
Step 1. We start the proof by looking at any y 0 2 f0; 1g k ; m 0 2 f0; 1g n ; h 0 2 H and evaluating the probability of the event C k (m 0 ) = hh 0 ; y 0 i. To do that, we rst consider some string r 0 2 f0; 1g L and evaluate the probability of the event C k (m 0 ) = hh 0 ; y 0 i given that r 0 was chosen by the Sender during the Commit phase. We denote this probability by Pr C k (m 0 ) = hh 0 ; y 0 i j r 0 ]. , after picking r 0 it is guaranteed that y 0 is part of the commitment string. As for h 0 , in order for it to be in the commitment string we need to \hit it" when we pick a function at random from the set fh 2 H : h(r 0 ) = m 0 g. Since H is a uniform hash-family, we know that for all r 0 ; m 0 the size of that set is exactly jHj=2 n , so the probability of picking h 0 from it is exactly 2 n =jHj. Thus 
Step 3. In this step we prove an upper-bound on the expression In this section we describe brie y how to modify the above scheme so as to get an O(k)-bit commitment scheme. On a message m, the Sender rst computes the k-bit string s = MD(m), and then apply the above commitment string to the string s. To de-commit m the Sender sends both the message m and the de-commit message of the rst scheme. The Receiver checks that s is the string being committed to in the rst message and that MD(m) = s.
Since we execute the rst scheme on a message of length k, then the commitmentstring is of length 7k + 2k = 9k, regardless of the message length.
It is immediate to prove that if MD is a collision-free hash function then this scheme too is a commitment scheme. We omit this proof from this extended abstract.
Open Problems
An interesting open problem is to reduce the assumptions needed for a commitment scheme. In particular, it is not known whether universal one-way hash functions (in the sense of Naor and Yung 17]) are su cient for commitment schemes in the unbounded receiver model. 6 Another open problem is to design e cient commitment schemes which have nice homomorphism properties. In particular, in some scenarios it is desirable to be able to compute a commitment for a + b (or a b) from the commitments to a and to b.
